SOLILOVÁ, V.: Transfer pricing rules in EU member states. Acta univ. agric. et silvic. Mendel. Brun., 2010, LVIII, No. 3, pp. 243-250 
1 issues were important to a rather small circle of tax specialists, primarily the tax advisers of large multinational enterprises (MNEs). As the countries of the world have become increasingly intergrated economically, the importance of these issues has mushroomed. Many small and medium size fi rms now engage in cross-border transactions that cause them to face international tax issues rather regularly.
In the international tax area there are exist a lot of issues, but one them transfer pricing 2 continues to be the most important international tax issue that many MNEs face. The vast majority of the interviewed MNEs believe that transfer pricing will be very important to their organizations over the next two years, while 65 % of respondents believe that transfer pricing is more important today than it was two years ago, according to the [2007] [2008] Transfer pricing Global survey by Ernst & Young. Why is transfer pricing so important for MNEs? MNEs use transfer pricing for sales and other transfers of goods and services their corporate group (inter-company transaction). Sometimes related persons engaged in cross-border transactions can avoid the income taxes of a country through their manipulation of transfer prices. For example, Aco might avoid paying income taxes in country A by setting a price on the sale of its manufactured goods to Bco that results in its earning little or no profi t. If the eff ective tax rate in county B is lower than the eff ective tax rate in country A, then the total tax burden of the affi liated companies Aco and Bco would be reduced through the use of inappropriate transfer prices. If country B is a tax haven, then the affi liated companies would pay little or no tax on their combined profi ts. Thereupon there is worldly widely used principle -arm's lenght principle -the basic transfer pricing rule used in international tax area. Under these principle, related taxpayers must set transfer pricing for any inter-company transaction as if they were unrelated entities all other aspects of the relationship were unchanged. This concept is set out defi nitively in art. 9 of the OECD Model Treaty which form the basis of many bilateral tax treaties.
In accordance with art. 9(2) and 25 of the OECD Model Treaty, most countries entering into tax treaties have committed themselves to consider making adjustments to the transfer prices used to compute taxable income of their taxpayers if those prices have been adjusted by a treaty partner in accordance with the arm's length principle. A modifi cation to a transfer price used by one taxpayer to take account of a modifi cation made to the transfer price used by an affi liated taxpayer is reff ered to as a "correlative adjustment".
In recent years, some countries have sought to reach agreement with their taxpayers on the me thodo lo gies to be used in setting transfer prices before a transfer pricing dispute has actually arisen. This is so-called "advance pricing agreement" (APA). In some instances, two or more governments may use the dispute-resolution mechanism in their tax treaties to agree jointly on the pricing methodology to be used by a taxpayer.
Notwithstanding, confl icts between countries over transfer prices are commonplace. That's why a few newer treaties do include a procedure for binding arbitration. This procedure is set out in art. 25 paragraph 5 of the OECD Model Treaty (update of the OECD Model Treaty in the 2008) This paper is focused on Transfer pricing rules used in the EU member states which should prevent taxpayers (MNEs) from shi ing income to related person organized in tax havens or in countries where they enjoy some special tax benefi t -relatively low tax rate or tax holiday and so on. In ge neral, the countries should protect their own tax re venues throught using transfer pricing rules. The tax authorities should use transfer pricing procedures to eliminate the erosion of the tax base in their countries. They should imposed penalties and adjustments in the course of an audit that can be so substantial that it may result in adverse eff ect on the company's performance and survival.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The basic source of my research was the OECD TP Guidelines 3 . The OECD has been working for many years to achieve an international consensus on transfer pricing rules. In 1979, the OECD published a report entitled Transfer pricing and multinational enterprises, which was supplemented in 1984. Du ring 1992 and 1993 the OECD established a task force to review report, so in 1995 the OECD issued a major volume "Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations". Revisions were made in 1996 , 1997 , 1998 and 1999 In this paper were used basic scientifi c methods such as analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction, description, comparison.
RESULTS
Firstly, I would like to mention of transfer pricing rules generally. Mainly the OECD TP Guidelines and its aplication of the arm's length principle, comparability analysis, tranfer pricing methods for determining the arm's length price, transfer pricing documentation, dispute prevention as an APA and in the end dispute resolution as Arbitration process.
Secondly, I focus on particular transfer pricing rules of EU member states.
The OECD TP Guidelines provide guidance on the application of the arm's length principle to the pricing, for tax purposes, of cross-border trans-actions between associated enterprises. In a global economy where multinational enterprises play a prominent role, governments need to ensure that the taxable profi ts of MNEs are not artifi cially shi ed out of their jurisdiction and that the tax base reported by MNEs in their country refl ects the economic activity undertaken therein. In other side, for taxpayers, it is essential to limit the risks of economic double taxation that may result from a dispute between two countries on the determination of the arm's length remuneration for their cross-border transactions with associated enterprises.
When transfer pricing does not refl ect market forces and the arm's length principle, the tax lia bili ties of the associated enterprises and the tax re venues of the host countries could be distored. Therefore, OECD member countries have agreed that for tax purposes the profi ts of associated enterprises may be adjusted as necessary to correct any such distortions and thereby ensure that the arm's length principle is satisfi ed. OECD member countries consider that an appropriate adjustment is achieved by establishing the conditions of the commercial and fi nancial relations that they would expect to fi nd between independent enterprises in similar transactions under similar circumstances. The authoritative statement of the arm's length principle is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty 4 . Attention is focused on the nature of the dealing between MNEs and on whether the conditions thereof diff er from the conditions that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled transactions. The analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, which is referred to as a "comparability analysis" is at the heart of the application of the arm's length principle. Unfortunately, there are some signifi cant cases in which the arm's length principle is diffi cult and complicated to apply, for example, in MNEs dealing in the integrated production of highly spe cia lised goods, in unique intangible, and/or in the provision of specialised services. A practical diffi culty in applying the arm's length principle is that as so ciated enterprises may engage in transactions that independent enterprises would not undertake. Such transactions may not necessarily be motivated by tax avoidance. In some cases it will be possible to apply the arm's length principle to arrive at a single fi gure (e.g. price or margin) that is the most reliable to establish whether the conditions of a transaction are arm's length. However, because transfer pricing is not an exact science, there will also be many occasions when the application of the most appropriate method or methods produces a range of figu res all of which are relatively equally reliable. In these cases, diff erences in the fi gures that comprise the range may be caused by the fact that in gene ral the application of the arm's length principle only produces an approximation of conditions that would have been established between in de pendent enterprises. It is also possible that the diff erent points in a range represent the fact that in de pen dent enterprises engaged in comparable transactions under comparable circumstances may not establish exact ly the same price for the transaction.
Application of the arm's length principle is gene ra lly based on comparability analysis 5 . In order for such comparisons to be useful, the economically relevant characteristics of the situations being compared must be suffi ciently comparable 6 . I order to determine whether the comparison makes sense 5 relevant comparability factors were defi ned: chara cte ris tics of products / servises, functional analy sis, contractual terms, economics circumstances and business strategies. So, in determining whether controlled and uncontrolled transactions or entities are comparable, a functional analysis is necessary and the most important. This functional analysis seeks to identify and compare the economically signifi cant activities and responsibilities undertaken, assets used and risks assumed by the parties to the transactions. It will also be to determine the legal rights and obligations of the taxpayer in performing its functions. The functions that taxpayers and tax administrations might need to identify and compare include e.g., design, manufacturing, assembling, research and development, servicing, purchasing, distribution, marketing, advertising, transportation, fi nancing, and management. Usually, in the open market, the assumption of increased risk would also be compensated by an increase in the expected return. The search for information on potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions and the process of identifying comparables is dependent upon prior analysis of the taxpayer's controlled transaction and of the relevant comparability factors. It is the whole analytical process: the preliminary analy sis of the conditions of the controlled transaction, the identifi cation of potential comparables, the selection of the transfer pricing method and ultimately a conclusion.
OECD TP Guidelines study various tranfer pricing methods for determining the arm's length price on sales of tangible or intangible personal property. There are fi ve prefered methods:
• Traditional transfer pricing methods:
• Traditional transaction methods and transactional profi methods can be used to establish whether the conditions imposed in the commercial or fi nancial relations between associated enterprises are consistent with the arm's length principle. The selection transfer pricing methods always aims at fi nding the most appropriate method for a particular case. Nevertheless fi rst three methods are extremely diffi cult, so it is impossible to apply in many important cases for example where there is no satisfactory evidence of CUP and where it is not possible to apply the resale price or cost plus methods. In these situations it is necessary to apply the two last methods, profi t based methods, which are used more o en than traditional transfer pricing methods.
Of course is very important for taxpayers maintain and be prepared to provide documentation regarding how its transfer prices were established and if transfer pricing policy is arm's lenght. OECD TP Guidelines provides direction for tax authorities on the development of the rules and procedures on transfer pricing documentation (TPD). Further in the EU the Council adopted a Code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for as so cia ted enterprises 7 in the European Union (EU TPD). The purpose of the EU TPD is to standardize documentation that MNEs must provide to tax authorities and reducing the compliance costs of complying with transfer pricing documentation rules of va rious member states. The EU TPD concept consists of two main parts, Masterfi le and country specifi c documentation. Each taxpayer should try to determine transfer pricing in accordance with the arm's length principle based upon information reasonably availa ble at the time of the determination. The information needed will vary depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
Because confl icts between countries over transfer prices are commonplace. The United States established the formal APA programme as a dispute prevention. An APA is an administrative approach that attempt to prevent transfer pricing disputes from arising by determining criteria for applying the arm's length principle to transactions in advance of those transactions taking place. APAs can be unilateral (where agreed between one tax administration and a taxpayer), bilateral (where agreed between two tax administrations with the taxpayer) and multinational (involving more than two tax administrations). The world's fi rst advance pricing agreement as a prevention of disputes was concluded between the United States and Australia for Apple in 1991. The OECD supplemented its OECD TP Guidelines with an Annex containing Guidelines for conducting APAs under the mutual agreement procedure. Today a lot of states have formal APA programmes. Now, I make a mention of dispute resolution -EC Arbitration Convention and Arbitration process according art. 25 paragraph 5 OECD Model Treaty. EC Arbitration convention was approved on 23th July 1990 by EU member states (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and UK). Of course with accession new member states was amended in November 2006. The Arbitration Convention is designed to apply in all situations in which profits subject to tax in one member state are subject to tax in another as a result of an adjustment to correct non-arm's lenght pricing arrangements. The Arbitration convention will not be applicable in any cicrumstance in which the authorities consider that the double taxation arises through deliberate manipulation of transfer prices.
Taking a due from EU Arbitration Convention, OECD countries have agreed to broaden the mechanisms available to taxpayers involved in cross-border disputes over taxation matters by introductions the possibility of arbitration if the other methods to resolve disagreements fail. So in 2008 was added new paragraph to the Mutual agreement procedure art. 25 (5) of the OECD Model Treaty which provides that in the event the competent authorities are not able to reach any agreement in relation to a case presented to the competent authority for resolution within a period of two years from presentation of the case it may be submitted to arbitration at the request of the taxpayers. The arbitration process must be completed and a mutual agreement must be concluded within 18 months from the submission of the request. The Arbitration convention can be used only for transfer pricing disputes.
In this second part I focus on particular transfer pricing rules in the EU member states. During my research I tried to answer on following questions:
If in the EU member states exist: 1. relevant provisions of domestic legislation referring to the Arm's Length Principle, 2. reference to the OECD TP Guidelines in domestic legislation, 3. relevant legislation containing a defi nition of related parties or associated enterprises, 4. relevant legislation containing guidance on transfer pricing methods, 5. relevant regulations in relation to transfer pricing documentation requirements, 6. relevant regulations on specifi c transfer pricing audit procedures and / or specifi c transfer pricing penalties, 7. relevant regulations on Advance Pricing Arrangements. Answer on information mentioned above are in Table I . -Transfer pricing rules in EU member states.
The arm's length principle apply all Member States besides Ireland because its defi nition of arm's length principle is so unreasonable in Ireland Corporate Income Tax Act that it is not applicable. Gene ral ly there are no specifi c transfer pricing rules in Ireland. Hence, the OECD Guidelines will be regarded as giving important guidence and accepted standard by tax authorities in the Ireland enviroment in the case of any dispute. Ireland as the member of OECD should be accept the organisation's guidelines.
The explicit reference to the OECD Guidelines is not staking out in domestic legislation of Ireland, Greece, Slovenia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Poland. However, their transfer pricing legislation if it exist and tax authorities have generally adopted the arm's length principle and methods provided by OECD Guidelines. In most of Member States were the OECD Guidelines published in administrative decrees or the OECD Guidelines have been borrowed as offi cial regulations i.e. in Austria. In Lithuania, the OECD Guidelines were carried over into Lithuania transfer pricing legislation. Nevertheless, local rules take precedent and in the event of confl ict with the OECD Guidelines.
All of Member States beside Austria have the definition of related persons or associated enterprises in domestic legislation which is usually corresponding provision to Art. 9 OECD Model Treaty. In Austria there is no specifi c defi nition of related parties, there is general reference to Art. 9 OECD Model Treaty. However Estonian tax legislation provides a rather broad defi nition of related person i.e. if there exist economic relationship between parties transfer pricing rules cannot be applicable because they are unrelated parties. Further Portuguese tax law contains comprehensive defi nition of related persons (associated enterprises). And according to the full extensive defi nition of related persons set in the Slovak Republic, all companies within the company group most likely as related parties.
Each of Member States applies the transfer pricing methods and relies on the general recommendation of the OECD Guidelines. Majority of Member States explicitly notice the transfer pricing methods in their domestic legislation which to be used for determining arm's length prices. Other Member States explicitly provide the reference to the OECD Guidelines.
All of Member States besides Ireland apply at least general rules on transfer pricing documentation. However, Ireland's taxpayers keep adequate documentation to be able to justify their pricing arrangements as being arm's length in responce to any transfer pricing audits. In Latvia is the transfer pricing documentation in processing now. So for the time being Latvia's taxpayers and tax authorities rely on recommendation of the OECD Guidelines (Chapter 5). In most of Member States have been documentation requirements published in admi nis tra ti ve decrees and have relied on the recommendation of the OECD guidelines and of the EU TP Documentation.
Only in Slovak Republic the tax authorities started to run special transfer pricing tax inspections. There exist a specialised group of staff to handle transfer pricing audits in Slovak Republic. In Belgium there has been created a specifi c transfer pricing audit team too that composed of 8 fi eld auditors and 1 support staff and have been issued administrative guidelines on trasfer pricing audits and documentation. The Spain's Corporate Income Tax Act states the basic principle of a specifi c transfer pricing audit procedure. The specifi c transfer pricing penalties have been applicable in the states: Germany, France, Slovenia, Denmark, Greece, Finland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Bulgary and Romania as penalties for i.e.
• tax evasion, tax fraud, wrong information in tax return -Germany, • failure to provide complete information to the tax authorities -France, • if documentation is not available -Slovenia, • the diff erence between the agreed transfer prices and the market price -Greece, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, • failure to comply with the transfer pricing documentation requirements -Hungary, • failure to present the transfer pricing documentation fi le -Romania. Currently, there are no provisions enabling taxpayers to negotiate Advance Pricing Arrangements with the tax authorities in Estonia, Ireland, Slove nia, Denmark, Greece, Sweden, Latvia and Bulgaria. However, it is possible to obtain an opinion from the tax authorities on a case-by-case as a unilateral APA in Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. Also it is possible to apply for bilateral APA only with countries with which state has tax treaties, in accordance with the Art. 25 OECD Model Treaty (Mutual Agreement Article). In Latvia there the Cabi net of Ministers has dra ed APA rules. Nevertheless, in practice these rules are used rarely for negotiating advance pricing arrangements in Latvia. Further, the Lithuania's Ministry of Finance to set up the framework for a more formal APA system. Other Member States have relevant regulations on Advance Pricing Arrangements i.e. bilateral APAs are pursued on the basis of Art. 25 OECD Model Treaty in Austria and Germany.
CONCLUSION
International tax issues already have not been problems of narrow circle of Multinational Enterprises. The eff ect of globalizace and international business development causes that many small and medium size fi rms now engage in cross-border transactions that cause them to face international tax issues rather regularly. One of the important area of international taxes is transfer pricing. Transfer price is a price set by a taxpayer when selling to, buying from, or sharing resources with a related (associated) person. The transactions between these persons should be assessed at their arm's length price in according the arm's length principle -international accepted standard -as the price which would have been agreed between unrelated parties in free market conditions. This paper is focud on the tranfer pricing rules used in particular EU Member States so as if EU Member States apply the arm's length principle, defi ne the related persons, apply recommendations of the OECD Guidelines, use the transfer pricing methods, require TP Documentation, exercise specifi c transfer pricing audit or impose specifi c penalties and apply APAs. Transfer pricing rules should prevent taxpayers from shi ing income to related person organized in tax havens or in countries where they enjoy some special tax benefi t i.e. relatively low tax rate or tax holiday and so on. The associated enterprises are conscious of seriousness of the transfer pricing issue, because imposed penalties and adjustments in the course of an audit that can be so substantial that it may result in adverse eff ect on the company's performance and survival. The arm's length principle apply all Member States besides Ireland because its defi nition of arm's length principle is not applicable. The explicit reference to the OECD Guidelines is not staking out in some domestic legislation. However, their transfer pricing legislation if it exist and tax authorities have generally adopted the arm's length principle and methods provided by OECD Guidelines. In most of Member States were the OECD Guidelines published in administrative decrees or the OECD Guidelines have been borrowed as offi cial regulations. All of Member States beside Austria have the defi nition of related persons or associated enterprises in domestic legislation which is usually corresponding provision to Art. 9 OECD Model Treaty. In Austria there is general reference to Art. 9 OECD Model Treaty. Each of Member States applies the transfer pricing methods and relies on the general recommendation of the OECD Guidelines. Majority of Member States explicitly notice the transfer pricing methods in their domestic legislation which to be used for determining arm's length prices. Other Member States explicitly provide the reference to the OECD Guidelines. All of Member States apply at least general rules on transfer pricing documentation. In most of Member States have been documentation requirements published in administrative decrees and have relied on the recommendation of the OECD Guidelines and of the EU TP Documentation. Only in Slovak Republic and in Spain the tax authorities started to run special transfer pricing tax inspections. The specifi c transfer pricing penalties have been applicable only in some states as penalties for not complying the arm's length principle and TP requirements. Currently, there are no provisions enabling taxpayers to negotiate Advance Pricing Arrangements with the tax authorities in each Member State. However, it is possible to obtain an opinion from the tax authorities on a case-by-case. Other Member States have relevant regulations on Advance Pricing Arrangements i.e. bilateral APAs are pursued on the basis of Art. 25 OECD Model Treaty. On the basis of my research I can say that transfer pricing rules in EU Member states are under the recom men da tions of the OECD Guidelines to be dealt with these issues for long time. The tax authorities have possibilities of prevent taxpayers from shi ing income to related person from their states.
SOUHRN
Pravidla převodních cen v členských státech EU Problematika mezinárodního zdanění se už netýká jen úzkého kruhu -nadnárodních společností. Vlivem rostoucí globalizace a rozvoji mezinárodního obchodu se nyní i malé a střední podniky stále více se zapojují do zahraničních transakcí a čelí tak problémům z oblasti mezinárodního zdanění. Jedna z významných oblastí mezinárodního zdanění je tzv. transfer pricing neboli převodní ceny, které lze defi novat jako ceny uplatňované u transakcí uskutečněných mezi dvěma daňovými subjekty ekonomicky nebo personálně spojenými. Tyto ceny musejí být stanoveny ve stejné výši, jako by byly sjednávány mezi subjekty, které nejsou ekonomicky či personálně spojené a odpovídají tedy principu tržního odstupu, mezinárodně uznávaného standardu. V příspěvku jsou uvedena pravidla převodních cen jednotlivých členských států EU, a to zda uplatňují princip tržního odstupu, defi novaly spojené osoby, využívají doporučení z OECD Směrnice, aplikují transfer pricing metody, vyžadují transfer pricing dokumentaci, vykonávají specifi cký audit či ukládají specifi cké pokuty nebo zda uplatňují APA proceduru. Užívání těchto pravidel by mělo zabránit daňovým poplatníkům převést daňové zisky spojené osobě umístněné v jurisdikci s nižším zdaněním nebo v zemi, kde jí budou plynout lepší daňová zvýhodnění např. v podobě daňových prázdnin. Spojené osoby si vážnost problematiky převodních cen plně uvědomují, neboť případné dorovnání daně včetně penále uvalené na základě výsledků daňové kontroly by mělo zcela negativní vliv na jejich budoucí ekonomický a fi nanční vývoj. Princip tržního odstupu aplikují všechny členské státy EU kromě Irska, neboť irské ustanovení o trž-ním odstupu je v praxi neaplikovatelné. Přímý odkaz na OECD Směrnici nemají ve své legislativě uvedeny všechny státy, přesto přijaly do svých legislativ princip tržního odstupu a transfer pricing metody vhodné pro stanovení výše zmíněného principu. Ostatní členské státy OECD Směrnici vydaly v podobě pokynů ministerstva fi nancí nebo ji zcela přijaly jako ofi ciální regulaci. Všechny člen-ské státy kromě Rakouska mají defi nici spojených či sdružených osob v legislativě, která je v souladu s článkem 9 OECD Modelové smlouvy, Rakousko se přímo na článek v ní odkazuje. Všechny státy aplikují transfer pricing metody, většina z nich je taxativně vymezuje a ostatní se odkazují na OECD Směrnici. Členské státy uplatňují všeobecná pravidla týkající se TP Dokumentace. Ve vět-šině z nich byly vydány požadavky na TP Dokumentaci v podobě pokynů ministerstva fi nancí, které vychází z doporučení uvedených v OECD Směrnici nebo v EU TP Documentaci. Pouze na Slovensku a ve Španělsku je stanovena speciální procedura auditu. Speciální pokuty udělují jen vybrané státy a jedná se především o pokuty za nedodržení principu tržního odstupu či požadavků na TP Dokumentaci. APA procedura není aplikovatelná ve všech členských státech, ale existuje možnost získat alespoň závazné posouzení od správce daně. Zavedený APA systém v ostatních členských státech je v souladu s ustanovením v článku 25 OECD Modelové smlouvy. Na základě zjištěných výsledků je zřejmé, že pravidla převodních cen v jednotlivých členských stá-tech EU jsou v souladu s doporučením OECD, která se problematikou dlouhodobě zabývá, a správci daně mají možnosti, jak zabránit přesunu daňových zisků z jejich států. převodní ceny, princip tržního odstupu, předběžné cenové dohody -APA, OECD Směrnice o pře-vodních cenách, sdružené podniky
